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The thesis evaluates the extent to which human rights were promoted in United 
States Military Humanitarian and Civic Assistance exercises in Latin America.  This is 
important because the promotion of human rights is a stated foreign policy goal, even in 
security cooperation programs.  It will be argued that a human rights focus matters in the 
selection of training objectives, engagement in the interagency process, and coordination 
with the host nation.  Comparative case analysis of Opening Roads-Ecuador 1987 and 
New Horizons-Nicaragua 1999 indicates that the post-Cold War US military is 
implementing some principles congruent with a human rights perspective, such as 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The occupation of Veracruz, Mexico from May to November 1914 by the United 
States military included the most comprehensive, if not the earliest example in Latin 
America of the types of activities characteristic of military humanitarian assistance.  In 
the face of an abysmal health and sanitation situation rife with malaria, tuberculosis, and 
dysentery Army medical officers concluded that unless the conditions changed, there 
would be high rates of disease and death among the soldiers.1  Without the assistance of 
the local government, the army carried out programs to collect refuse, control malaria, 
clean latrines, kill vermin, provide vaccinations to the local population and enforce 
sanitation standards in Veracruz.  The results were impressive, with a decline in the local 
death rate and the troops being no more susceptible to disease than they would in the 
US.2  But the results were also ephemeral, since the withdrawal of the US forces meant 
the end of their programs.  It was only a matter of weeks before “it was difficult to tell 
that the Americans had ever occupied the city.”3  
An emphasis on the speed of implementing projects that provide some benefit to 
the local population, rather than the sustainability of the projects once the American 
forces depart has continued over the years.  This is evident in the counterinsurgency 
strategy, dating from the 1960s, of winning the hearts and minds of local populations by 
seeing to the provision of their basic needs, such as potable water and healthcare.  These 
projects, many of which were initiated and carried out by service members who had a 
genuine interest in the well being of the local people, were characterized by doing what 
could be done with what was available.  The undertakings were implemented quickly and 
would continue as long as military units were available to provide the assistance. The US 
military’s Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) programs include a statutory 
requirement to provide training for American armed forces in their occupational 
specialty, and that the projects neither duplicate nor compete with other American foreign 
                                                 
1 Robert E. Quirk.  An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz.  (New 
York: W. W. Norton &  Company, 1967).  129.  
2 Ibid., 138. 
3 Ibid., 171.  
2 
assistance efforts.  Military humanitarian assistance programs have tended to focus on 
meeting training objectives (in construction, for example) rather than forging a 
relationship with civilian partners such as the U.S. Agency for International 
Development.  Evaluation of military humanitarian assistance conducted in the past 
twenty years point to high levels of satisfaction by the military participants in being able 
to better the lives of people in developing countries4.  However, these same evaluations 
also bring shortcomings to light.  In some cases, projects intended to foster goodwill led 
to suspicion and hostility.  In numerous cases clinics, roads, or schools were constructed 
that were never used.5  In most instances, coordination with representatives of the host 
nation was limited to approving the project, with minimal involvement in planning, 
execution, or evaluation.6  
Aid agencies and non-governmental organizations have criticized military units 
from a number of countries, including the United States, for providing assistance that was 
“unsustainable and damagingly short term” as well as “inappropriate for the conditions 
and the target populations.”7  Such critiques point to some of the differences between 
military humanitarian assistance programs and those provided by non-governmental, 
inter-governmental, and civilian governmental organizations.  Military humanitarian 
assistance projects usually span only a few months while the work of their civilian 
counterparts may last for years.  Political and training objectives guide the former while 
principles of neutrality and impartiality often direct the latter, particularly those of non-
governmental organizations.8  Another dissimilarity is that, until recently, changes in 
relief and development thinking have altered civilian but not military policies. 
                                                 
4 Jeffrey E. Drifmeyer and Craig H. Llewellyn, U.S. Participants Perspectives on Military Medical 
Humanitarian Assistance, Measures of Effectiveness 02-04 (Bethesda: Center for Disaster and 
Humanitarian Assistance Medicine, 2002), 7.     
5 General Accounting Office, Department of Defense: Weaknesses in Humanitarian and Civic 
Assistance Programs (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1994), 5. 
6 Jeffrey E. Drifmeyer and Craig H. Llewellyn, Host Nation Participants Perspectives on Military 
Medical Humanitarian Assistance, Measures of Effectiveness 02-05 (Bethesda: Center for Disaster and 
Humanitarian Assistance Medicine, 2002), 1. 
7 Jane Barry and Anna Jefferys.  A Bridge Too Far: Aid Agencies and the Military in Humanitarian 
Response.  Humanitarian Practice Network Paper, No.37.(January 2002). Available online: www. 
reliefweb.int/w/lib.asp  Accessed 24 October 2003.  13. 
8 Jeffrey E. Drifmeyer and Craig H. Llewellyn, Overview of Overseas Humanitarian Assistance, 
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, and Excess Property Programs.  Measures of Effectiveness 02-01 
(Bethesda: Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine, 2002), 8. 
3 
Disaster relief efforts in the 1960s, whether provided by civilian or military 
personnel focused on meeting immediate needs of people in distress.  However, over the 
course of the decades, civilian organizations have linked disaster relief with economic 
development.  Between the 1970s and the mid 1990s, critiques of disaster relief efforts 
led to significant changes in how civilian agencies plan disaster relief.  These changes 
sought to address the unintended adverse consequences of relief efforts on a recipient 
nation’s economic development, such as the impact of the distribution of used clothing on 
textile industries and food on local agricultural enterprises.9  Policies that linked relief 
and development were initially adopted by a few non-governmental organizations, 
including the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief and Catholic Relief Services, in the 
1970s and were standard thinking in the major foreign assistance agencies by 1997.10  
A second major change in disaster relief and development thinking has been the 
influence of the emerging human rights agenda.  This agenda, which promotes social and 
economic rights alongside political and civil rights, has been adopted by a growing 
number of non-governmental organizations and foreign development agencies.  It 
includes the right of people to participate in their economic development and the rights to 
minimal standards of water, food, and shelter across the entire population.11   
The frequency of American military participation in humanitarian assistance 
operations since the 1990s has led to a recognition in the military that its efforts need to 
be coordinated with intergovernmental, non-governmental, and civilian governmental 
entities that work on relief and development.  However, the conceptual linkage between 
these activities and the promotion of human rights is less evident to the military.  The 
absence of an explicit human rights approach to military humanitarian assistance is 
troubling for several reasons.  First, the promotion of human rights is a stated foreign 
                                                 
9 David Chandler.  “The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped A 
New Humanitarian Agenda,” in Human Rights Quarterly 23 (2001), 682;  Randolph C. Kent.  Anatomy of 
Disaster Relief: The International Network in Action.  (London: Pinter Publishers, 1987), 140. 
10 Ian Smillie, Relief and Development: The Struggle for Synergy.  Thomas J. Watson Jr.. Institute for 
International Studies  Occassional Paper No. 33.  (1998).  Available online: www.ciao.net.org/wps/ 
Watson.smi07.pdf  Accessed 4 May 2004.  xxvi; Chandler, 686; www.catholicrelief. org/where_ we_ work/ 
africa/sudan/index.cfm  Accessed 3 May 2004. 
11 Cuny Center.  “Greater Efficiency in Humanitarian Assistance Operations: Task 1 and 2 Reference 
Materials on the Capabilities and Activities of NGOs, the UN, the Private Sector, and USG Agencies.”  
Dated January 2002.  Available online: www.thecunycenter.org/publications/greaterefficiency.pdf  
Accessed 29 January 2004.  113. 
4 
policy goal of the United States.  Second, according to American policy for foreign 
development assistance and military humanitarian assistance, a goal is to assist the 
poor.12  Programs supporting this goal should consider the growing consensus among 
relief, humanitarian assistance, and development entities that policies intending to create 
sustainable development must recognize human rights in order to improve rather than 
merely ameliorate the situation of the poor.  Finally, the absence of a human rights 
approach to humanitarian assistance can impede military interoperability with other 
assistance providers.   
In military Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) exercises, a human rights 
focus matters in the selection of training objectives that not only fulfill utilitarian 
requirements but also promote human development.  When military planners coordinate 
the exercise with the US embassy staff in the host country, the inclusion of 
representatives from development agencies can facilitate the integration of their human 
rights policies, such as promoting sustainable development, in project design.  In 
coordinating projects with the host nation, a human rights approach would go beyond 
involving policymakers and include representatives of the local population as well as the 
service providers in project planning, execution and evaluation.  A human rights 
approach to project planning, execution, and evaluation, because it is characterized by 
transparency and the inclusion of the local population, promotes a favorable local 
political climate. 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the extent to which human rights are 
supported by the Defense Department Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) 
program, one of the components of the “theater security cooperation plan,” the routine 
pattern of military exercises and interaction with foreign nations.  Two cases will be 
analyzed, the first from an exercise in 1987 in Ecuador and the second involving an 
exercise in 1999 in Nicaragua.  Having briefly described military humanitarian assistance 
programs and contrasted them with their civilian counterparts, I will describe the 
connection between human rights policy and military humanitarian assistance.   
                                                 
12 Foreign Assistance Act, U.S. Code, Title 22, Section 2151-1; U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 401. 
5 
The State Department’s Strategic Plan 2000 states, “Democracy and respect for 
human and labor rights are central components of US foreign policy,” and identifies the 
Departments of State and Defense, as well as the Agency for International Development, 
as lead agencies for promoting “respect for human rights” and taking “action to prevent 
and limit human rights crises.13  The Strategic Plan of 2000 is the most explicit of the 
foreign policy statements on human rights and security assistance, but the promotion of 
rights has been a policy goal for decades.  In 1987 the security assistance program was 
set up “to promote political freedom, the growth of democratic institutions, and respect 
for human rights.” In 1998, the State Department stated that strengthening respect for 
human rights was an important component of the “key objective” of “building 
democracy.”14   
Prior to 1985, Combatant Commanders allocated funds from their operation and 
maintenance budgets to support HCA.  Since 1985 Congress has appropriated funds 
specifically for HCA and the Defense Department gave responsibility for coordinating 
HCA to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.  The Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency’s Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid program is designed to shape 
“the international security environment in a manner that assures our allies and friends, 
deters threats against U.S. interests, and promotes peace, democracy, and human rights in 
unstable regions.”15  However, a review of program evaluations and policy statements 
provided in chapter two shows that in practice, the theoretical connection between human 
rights and humanitarian assistance is not evident. The disconnect between theory and 
practice has a number of sources.  One is that the objectives of HCA were narrowly 
defined until the late 1990s and the promotion of human rights was limited to ensuring 
that participants did not engage in acts of harassment or torture.  Another problem was 
                                                 
13 Department of State, Strategic Plan (2000).  Available online: www.state.gov/www/global/general-
foreign_policy/2000_dos_stratplan_body.pdf.  Accessed 3 September 2003.  61-62. 
14 Department of State, Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs FY 1987.  
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1998), 42; Department of State.  Congressional 
Presentation for Foreign Operations: Fiscal year 1998 Budget.  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1998), x, 347. 
15 Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, 
and Civic Aid (OHDACA) Appropriation.”  Available online: www.dsca.osd.mil/programs/HA/ 
OVERSEAS%20-HUMANITARIAN%20DISASTER%20AND%20CIVIC%20AID.pdf  Accessed 19 
September 2003.  1. 
6 
that through 1993, coordination of HCA with U.S. embassies and U.S. Agency for 
International Development missions was minimal.16  This precluded the incorporation of 
development planning by USAID that was congruent with human rights principles in 
HCA.  The position of the United States government on an emerging human rights 
agenda that includes social and economic development will be discussed in chapter 
2.Military humanitarian assistance can be improved if we draw on the experiences and 
best practices of development agencies and non-governmental organizations, as well as 
military experiences with Civil Military Operations Centers, to strengthen training, refine 
policies, and draft measures of effectiveness. A basic human rights perspective should be 
made to guide the planning, execution, and evaluation of projects in order to enhance 
effectiveness.   
In this study, I will draw upon the following international and national sources to 
provide a standard for assessing HCA exercise agreement with human rights approaches 
to development: the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Basic 
Handbook for Human Rights, the United Nations Development Program’s Integrating 
Human Rights with Sustainable Development, the US Agency for International 
Development’s Program and Operations Assessment Reports, and the World Bank World 
Development Report 2004.17  I will evaluate “Opening Roads” in Ecuador in 1987 and 
“New Horizons” in Nicaragua in 1999 to assess the extent to which human rights (or 
principles congruent with human rights) were reflected in project objectives, the 
interagency process, and host nation participation.  I will also consider the local political 
conditions that act as exogenous influences on implementation.  
The United States Southern Command conducted both cases selected for the study 
in the aftermath of natural disasters.  The first case, involving “Opening Roads” in 
                                                 
16 General Accounting Office.  Department of Defense: Changes Needed to the Humanitarian and 
Civic Assistance Program.  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), 3. 
17 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.  Human Rights: A Basic Handbook for UN 
Staff. Available online: www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/handbook.pdf  Accessed 19 September 2003;  
United Nations Development Program.  Integrating Human Rights with Sustainable Development.  
Available online: http://magnet.undp.org/Docs/policy5.html.  Accessed 5 February 2004; Agency for 
International Development, Linking Democracy and Development: An Idea for the Times, USAID Program 
and Operations Assessment Report No. 29 (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2001); World Bank, World 
Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People.  Available online: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/30028_overview.pdf  Accessed 15 November 2003. 
 
7 
Ecuador in 1987 was an HCA project involving the construction of a road.  The second 
case considers a more recent project in Nicaragua that included the construction of a 
health clinic in 1999.  The local political conditions in both cases involved host nation 
Chief Executives who welcomed and legislatures that opposed the American military 
presence.   
The major differences include the strategic climate, objectives, interagency 
process, and level of host nation participation in the planning.  The exercise in Ecuador 
was conducted during the Cold War, with narrowly defined objectives, and coordination 
with other agencies and the host nation consisting largely of gaining authorization.  The 
exercise in Nicaragua provides a rich contrast in the post-Cold War era with broad 
objectives and close coordination with other American agencies, national and local host 
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9 
II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 
A detachment from the Army Corps of Engineers arrives in a developing country 
to build a health clinic and a Joint Task Force deploys to a foreign disaster area to assist 
in relief efforts.  While one can assert that these are expressions of goodwill, can it be 
said that these activities support human rights?  This chapter will consider whether there 
is a relationship between military humanitarian assistance activities and human rights, 
and if so, the character of this relationship.  The chapter first discusses the concept of 
human rights, comparing definitions used by the State Department and the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR).  Then I will evaluate the 
guidance on human rights in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.  HCA 
intrinsically involves social and economic concerns and only circumstantially may 
involve such activities as torture or arbitrary arrest.  One way of making the promotion of 
human rights a more significant part of HCA would be to include social and economic 
rights in the operative concept of human rights.  I will provide a model for evaluation that 
deals with the complexity of humanitarian assistance efforts in seemingly simple 
construction projects and the how a human rights perspective can promote effectiveness. 
The case studies demonstrate that while during the Cold War the benefits of HCA 
to the local population were a secondary objective, after the Cold War they became the 
primary objective.  In the 1990s the Department of Defense identified humanitarian 
assistance as a mission and HCA was designated a component of this mission.18  The 
concurrent strengthening of the interagency process facilitated the incorporation of 
principles congruent with social and economic human rights in planning and 
implementing HCA. 
A. UN AND US POSITIONS  
The concept of human rights is based on the recognition that human beings are of 
intrinsic worth.  The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 
supports the “inherent dignity” of all human beings which is to be observed “without 
distinction of any kind” including “race, colour, sex, language, religion” or “the political,                                                  
18 Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Manual 3500.04: Universal Joint Task List, Version 1.1.  (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1995).  2-20. 
10 
jurisdictional, or international status of the country or territory to which a person 
belongs.”19  While human rights are established on the basis of their origin, they are 
“legally guaranteed by human rights law” such as “treaties and customs.”20  States are 
obliged to observe treaties they sign and, regardless of their consent, customary 
international law.21  The human rights contained in customary international law are a 
small fraction of the vast number specified in treaties and other instruments. 
Howard Wiarda divides human rights into three useful categories:  
1 torture and crimes against the person,  
2 political and civil rights 
3 social or economic rights22   
The categories also represent the historical sequence of their consideration by the 
international community.  Corresponding with their maturity are the strengths of “global 
consensus,” legal guarantees, and advocacy groups.23  The International War Crimes 
Tribunals that immediately followed the Second World War addressed human rights in 
the first category of crimes against persons.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
of 1948 embraces both the first and second categories of human rights, to include 
political and civil rights.  However, the levels of support given to them differ.  States may 
be willing to denounce torture, but given the range of political systems and cultures, there 
has been less agreement on political and civil rights.  The third and most recent category 
deals with social or economic rights, such as the right to clean water, food, shelter, 
healthcare, education and economic development. 
Social and economic rights were most comprehensively addressed by the United 
Nations in the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development and the 1993 World 
                                                 
19 United Nations General Assembly.  “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” in Human Rights 
Training: A Methodology on Human Rights Training Methodology.  Available online: 
www.unhchr.ch/pdf/train6.pdf  Accessed 15 August 2003.  17.  
20 United Nations  High Commissioner for Human Rights.  Human Rights, 3-4. 
21 Ibid. 4. 
22 Howard J. Wiarda, Democracy and Its Discontents: Development, Interdependence, and U.S. Policy 
in Latin America.  (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1995), 76. 
23 Ibid. 
11 
Conference on Human Rights, and can be measured by such instruments as the Human 
Development Index.24  The UN General Assembly’s Declaration on the Right to 
Development gave expression to a new and more comprehensive concept of human 
rights.25  Its assertion that “every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate 
in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development,” sought 
both the broadening and the integration of the human rights agenda.26   
The declaration was designed to reject state programs that pointed to a rise in 
gross national product while ignoring the gross disparity in wealth, an increase in per 
capita income as it carried out systematic torture, or the emergence of a fairly elected 
legislature when national sovereignty had been surrendered to foreign interests.  As 
summarized in a UN training manual:  
This right includes permanent sovereignty over natural resources; self-
determination; popular participation; equality of opportunity; and the 
advancement of adequate conditions for the enjoyment of other civil, 
cultural, economic, political and social rights.27 
An expanded and integrated human rights agenda has been developing internationally in 
the past two decades.  Part of the expansion has involved incorporation of the principle of 
“sustainable human development,” that seeks to link short-term effectiveness with long 
term objectives.28  The integration of human rights with “early warning, humanitarian 
operations, peacekeeping and development” is an ongoing project led by the OHCHR of 
the UN.29  The current UN approach to human rights is that civil, political, economic, 
social, and cultural rights are interdependent.   A  “rights based approach to 
                                                 
24 United Nations Development Program.  “Human Development Record.”  Available online: 
www.undp.org/ hdr2003/  Accessed 19 September 2003. 
25 United Nations  General Assembly.  Declaration on the Right to Development, G.R. 41/128 (4 
December 1986).  Available online: www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/74.htm  Accessed 17 July 2003. 
26 United Nations, High Commissioner for Human Rights.  Human Rights Training: A Manual on 
Human Rights Training Methodology.  Available online: www.unhchr.ch/pdf/train6.pdf  Accessed 19 
September 2003.  11.:   United Nations. Declaration on the Right to Development,  2. 
27 United Nations, High Commissioner for Human Rights. Human Rights Training. 11 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 54.:  Karen Kenny, When Needs are Rights: An Overview of UN Efforts to Integrate Human 
Rights in Humanitarian Action.  Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Occasional Paper 
no. 38.  (Providence: Brown University, 2000).  
12 
development,” therefore, includes the following elements: “express linkage to rights, 
accountability, empowerment, participation, and non-discrimination and attention to 
vulnerable groups.”30   
The UN Development Program has presented a “Framework for Assessing 
Progress” in table form (table 1).31  This acknowledges that given the resources in most 
developing states, it would be unreasonable to expect that all of the human rights of all 
the citizens can be realized immediately.  The training of legislators and jurists, the 
functioning of elections and bureaucracies, and the establishing of schools and clinics are 
all costly enterprises.  A rights perspective develops a baseline that identifies whose 
rights are being supported by state policies.  From this baseline, policies can be 
developed to target a reduction in those groups of persons whose rights are not being 
supported.  The framework can guide the state in its efforts to design effective policies 






Deprivation Perspective Inequality Perspective 
One 
Period 
What is the national 
average? 
Who are the most deprived?  
By: 
  Income quintile 
  Gender 
  Religion 
  Rural or urban 
  Ethnic group 
  Education level 
What is the disparity?  
Between: 
  Bottom and top income quintiles 
  Females and males 
  Worst-off and best-off regions 
  Rural and urban 
  Worst-off and best-off ethnic groups 
  No higher education and higher education 
Over time How has the 
national average 
changed? 
How have the most deprived 
social groups progressed 
How have disparities between social 
groups changed – have they widened or 
narrowed? 
Table 1. Framework for Assessing Progress (from United Nations Development 
Program).32  
                                                 
30 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Rights-based approaches.”  Available 
online: www.unhchr.ch/development/approaches-04.html.  Accessed 17 July 2003.   
31 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2000.  Available online: 
http://hdr.udp.org/reports/global/2000/en/pdf/hdr_2000  Accessed 9 October 2003, 108. 
32 Ibid. 
13 
While the above framework places the primary responsibility on the state, the 
human rights approach also recognizes roles for civil society, intergovernmental 
organizations, foreign states, and non-governmental organizations.  In a spirit of 
solidarity, they are called upon to assist in supporting human rights.  One approach would 
be to coordinate their support for development with policies that explicitly support human 
rights.  A less specific avenue would allocate a minimum of 20% of foreign aid budgets 
to basic social services.33  
Support for human rights is part of American tradition that is codified in law and 
further specified in policy.  However, in American law and most statements on policy, 
the concept of human rights only deals with acts of violence against persons, such as 
torture, and violations of civil and political liberties.  The section of the U.S. Code 
requiring that “international security assistance programs . . . will promote and advance 
human rights” limits the discussion of human rights to listing violations that would 
proscribe assistance.34   
A more comprehensive approach towards human rights is taken in USAID policy 
on development assistance, where projects are required to “emphasize the encouragement 
of development processes in which individual civil and economic rights are respected and 
enhanced.”35  Specific examples include projects that foster the “development of 
democratic principles and institutions that promote human rights” and increased 
awareness of women and ethnic groups to the judicial system and political processes.”36  
While not expressed in terms of human rights, the principles set forth on development 
assistance policy in the U.S. Code are largely in agreement with programs that promote 
economic rights.  The planning principles seek to “directly improve the lives of the 
poorest of their people,” involve “the people in the development process” at the local 
level, work towards “establishing and upgrading the institutional capacities” through 
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training, and develop “effective institutions of democratic governance” characterized by 
the “rule of law [and] mechanisms of accountability and transparency . . .”37  
The idea that economic development is a human right has been the subject of 
international controversy.  The principal advocates have been developing countries.  The 
American delegation’s statement to the UN Commission on Human Rights on 25 April 
2003 objected to the notion that “lack of development justifies the denial of 
internationally recognized human rights.”38  Recognition of development as a human 
right would mean that assistance given by industrialized nations to developing nations 
would be less a matter of optional charity than obligatory justice. 
The U.S. has reaffirmed its commitment to assisting other states in economic 
development and the principle that “the human person is [the] central subject of 
development.”39  However, it asserts that there is no “emerging consensus on the 
meaning and content of the right to development.”40  Ambassador George Moose 
summed up the link between human rights and development in stating that the  
“protection of basic civil and political rights [that] is indispensable to sustainable 
growth.”41   
Two primary sources of policy guidance are the White House and the Department 
of State.  In President George Bush’s National Security Strategy of the United States, 
issued in September 2002, the goals identified are “political and economic freedom, 
peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.”42  The 
“nonnegotiable demands of human dignity,” identified as civil and political rights will be 
                                                 
37 Foreign Assistance Act, U.S. Code, Title 22, sec. 2151 (2002). 
38 Joel Danies, “Right to Development, Delivered by Joel Danies, U. S. Government Delegation to the 
59th. Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights on 25 April 2003,” Available 
online:www.humanrights-usa.net/statements/0425RtoD.htm  Accessed 3 September 2003.  1. 
39 Ibid., 2. 
40 George Moose, “Remarks to the 57th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 27 March 
2001.”  Available online: www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/rm/2001/1775pf.htm  Accessed 27 July 2003.  2. 
41 Ibid., 1. 
42 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.  (Washington, 
D.C.: White House, 2002), 1. 
15 
promoted through foreign aid targeted to support movements toward democracy and 
pressures against those who “deny human rights.”43  
While the president observes that the world situation “where some live in comfort 
and plenty, while half of the human race lives on less than $2 a day” is “neither just nor 
stable,” the strategy of dealing with this “moral imperative and one of the top priorities of 
U.S. international policy” does not involve recognizing economic development as a 
human right.44  Rather, the approach follows the consensus arrived at during the UN 
Conference on Financing for Development that was held in Monterrey, Mexico in March 
of 2002.  Development aid will accordingly follow a long tradition of aid conditionality 
and be targeted to states that follow paths of political and economic liberalization, 
including “respect[ing] basic human rights” and “invest[ing] in their people” through 
both “health care and education.”45    
The National Security Strategy of September 2002 was issued after the State 
Department’s Strategic Plan 2000, but there has been a strong consistency in its policy 
statements.  In the State Department, the promotion of human rights is assigned to the 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.  On the Bureau’s official web page, in 
congressional testimony and in the report Supporting Human Rights and Democracy, the 
State Department’s concept of human rights emphasizes “freedom from torture” and civil 
and political rights.46   
Strategic Plan 2000 places the issue of human rights under the subheading of 
democracy and asserts: “Democracy and respect for human and labor rights are central 
components of U.S. foreign policy”.47  Supporting the goal of “democratic practices . . . 
and respect for human rights” are five strategies, one of which identifies the Department 
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of Defense as a lead agency in connection with human rights.48  The Departments of 
State and Defense, as well as USAID are lead agencies for the third strategy to “promote 
respect for human rights and take action to prevent and limit human rights crises.”49        
The current UN policy is that political, civil, social, and economic rights, 
including the right to development, are interdependent human rights.  This contrasts with 
the American position that recognizes political and civil rights, but not social and 
economic rights, as human rights.  As official statements of the US government have 
asserted, the connection between human rights and development is that the observance of 
political and civil rights are preconditions for economic development.  However, 
American international development assistance is programmed to support not only the 
political but also the economic development of states.  Additionally, American policy on 
development assistance encourages economic rights.  For these reasons, it appears that 
the American rejection of the notion of the right to development is largely a rejection of 
the idea that foreign aid should be a matter of justice and not charity. 
B.  HUMAN RIGHTS AND MILITARY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) supports the management of 
Department of Defense “involvement overseas” and its “role in developing and 
sustaining regional security arrangements” through programs that “promote human rights, 
the presence of a fair and effective military justice system, and civilian control of the 
military.”50  The DSCA’s Office of Humanitarian Assistance and Mine Action has 
budget authority over the “Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) 
Appropriation.”51  A fact sheet on the appropriation states how it supports the national 
strategy: 
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Maintaining a robust overseas presence aimed at shaping the international 
security environment in a manner that assures our allies and friends, deters 
threats against U.S. interests, and promotes peace, democracy and human 
rights in unstable regions.52  
While a general statement on promotion of human rights is given, further 
guidance related to human rights is less clear in the descriptions offered for either the 
Humanitarian Assistance or Foreign Disaster Relief and Emergency Response programs.  
Humanitarian Assistance programs, such as the “construction and repair” of schools and 
medical facilities or the provision of routine “medical, dental and veterinary care” are 
thought to foster “goodwill . . . promote democratic development and regional stability” 
and relieve suffering.53  Similarly, a description of Foreign Disaster Relief does not 
specify how human rights are promoted, while it does state that it “promote[s] democratic 
development and regional stability.”54 
Department of Defense policy governing Humanitarian and Civic Assistance 
activities further specifies that programs must advance the “security interests” of both the 
U.S. and the host country; “the specific operational readiness skills” of U.S. military 
participants, and American “foreign policy interests.”55  Additional requirements are that 
the activities “serve the basic economic and social needs of the people of the country 
concerned” and have the “approval of the host country’s national and local civilian 
authorities.”56  The closest relationship between these activities and the promotion of 
human rights, using a definition broader than the one defined in U.S. foreign policy, is 
the requirement to serve the social and economic needs of the host nation.   
The pertinent field manual for the conduct of joint Humanitarian Assistance and 
Disaster Relief makes limited references to promoting human rights.  Joint Doctrine for 
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Civil Military Operations speaks of USAID’s role in “human rights monitoring” during 
“post conflict recovery” and how military civic action can provide an opportunity for a 
“demonstration of improvement in host-nation military treatment of human rights.”57  
These and similar references in the publication do not specify a direct U.S. military role 
in the promotion of human rights. 
The weakness of the connection between humanitarian assistance or disaster relief 
and human rights is apparent in articles in the Defense Institute of Security Assistance 
Management (DISAM) Journal and annual departmental reports.  Articles indicate that 
humanitarian assistance has benefited people in the host-nation, provided valuable 
training to U.S. forces, and promoted regional stability.58  There have also been 
initiatives to “maximize the viability and sustainability of HCA projects,” but whether 
they were designed for, or had an impact on human rights advancement is not 
addressed.59   
Evaluation of programs that promote democracy and respect for human rights 
overseas are made in the State Department’s Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: 
The U.S. Record 2002-2003 and, to a lesser degree, in the Joint Report to Congress titled 
“Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest.”60  The State 
Department report includes numerous references to “human rights training that was 
integrated into all U.S. supported military exercises and operational training” and the 
Joint Report conveys that human rights training was included in Legal Studies programs 
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and International Military Education and Training.61  However, neither report refers to 
the promotion of human rights in humanitarian assistance or disaster relief.62 
That these reports do not link military humanitarian assistance or disaster relief 
with the promotion of human rights raises a number of questions.  Why is there no 
apparent link, should there be one, and what form might it take?  The connection between 
the promotion of human rights and military humanitarian assistance is moderated by the 
American understanding of human rights and the primary objectives of the operations.  
The goal of HCA is to provide occupational specialty focused training to U.S. military 
personnel in a foreign country.63  While valued, the benefits provided to host-nation 
peoples are incidental to the training.64  The basic goal of disaster relief is to complement 
host-nation authorities by providing assistance of limited duration and scope.65  
Given these limited operations and current policy on human rights, how are 
human rights promoted?  From the above discussion it is clear that the American concept 
of human rights focuses on the protection against, or prosecution for, violence against 
persons, and secondarily involves political and civil rights.  Since HCA involves training 
U.S. forces at the invitation of the host country, and the military aspect of disaster relief 
targets the stage prior to the transition to reconstruction, the promotion of human rights 
would seem to be concerns for the host nation or USAID.66  The U.S. military’s role 
would be that of fostering or establishing stability, which may be regarded as a necessary, 
but not sufficient, precondition for the flourishing of human rights.  Assistance may be 
considered to have an indirect role in promoting human rights if it is provided in 
recognition of a state’s progress in human rights. 
For each of the cases, the objectives, interagency process, coordination with the 
host nation, and local political conditions will be examined.  This will be followed by an 
analysis of the degree to which it supported a broadened human rights agenda.  Because 
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military humanitarian assistance is closely related to economic and social development, 
the human rights objectives will be those encompassing economic and social rights.  
Accordingly, the objectives of the projects will be viewed as supporting human rights to 
the degree that they support the broader and longer-term goal of the host nation in 
providing basic resources to its population, particularly the poor, on a sustained basis.  
While such criteria exceeds the requirement that “[HCA] activities shall serve the basic 
economic and social needs of the people of the country concerned,” they are in agreement 
with U.S. development assistance policy as well as rights approaches to development.67   
The interagency process has the potential to facilitate support for human rights 
objectives because USAID and non-governmental organizations that work in 
development generally establish long term commitments in the host country and have a 
stronger capacity for promoting sustainable development.68  In the planning stages, 
support could be in the form of information in such areas as needs, projects in progress, 
and available resources.69  Coordination can assist military commanders in projecting 
beyond their normally short-term involvement in relief or development efforts that may 
otherwise lead them to assign a low priority to “an early dialogue with the local 
community and starting sustainable development.”70  Additionally, planning with these 
entities may also serve to overcome the military’s characteristic of self-sufficiency that 
can have the effect of ignoring or hindering the development of local capacities.71 
In coordinating projects with the host nation, a human rights approach would go 
beyond involving policymakers and include representatives of the local population as 
well as the service providers in project planning, execution and evaluation.  The inclusion 
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of service providers and representatives of the local population are considered critical to 
the efficacy and sustainability of programs by a World Bank study.72    
The principal exogenous influence that can affect the outcome of a project is the 
local political condition.  A human rights approach to project planning, execution, and 
evaluation, because it is characterized by transparency and the inclusion of the local 
population, promotes a favorable local political climate.  However this is not necessarily 



















                                                 












THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
23 
III. EXERCISE OPENING ROADS – ECUADOR 1987 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The President of Ecuador and the Vice-President of the United States were 
confident that Exercise Opening Roads, a United States military humanitarian assistance 
operation planned for 1987, would be of benefit to the people of Ecuador and promote 
American goodwill.  However, only a few kilometers of road were constructed and 
opposition to the American military presence culminated in a resolution by the 
Ecuadorean Congress calling for the immediate withdrawal of American forces.  Why 
was this gesture of goodwill received with suspicion and hostility?  This paper will 
examine the objectives, American interagency coordination, host nation participation, and 
local political conditions to explain the results.  Then it will propose how a human rights 
focus could have contributed to a better outcome through the selection of a project that 
assists the poor, the inclusion of the local population and service providers in the project 
planning, and promoting sustainable development. 
1. Objectives 
The primary objective of Exercise Opening Roads was to provide engineers in the 
Army Reserve and National Guard the opportunity to rotate in for two weeks of unit 
training.  Two thirds of the Army’s engineers were in the Reserve and National Guard 
and the annual training exercise was critical to teach them the skills they would need if 
they were activated.  It was designed to get them to experience all of the steps of an 
overseas deployment, including planning, movement, building a camp in an undeveloped 
theater, working on the assigned project, and redeploying.   
The secondary objective of such exercises, as reported by Secretary of Defense 
Frank Carlucci to the United States Congress, was to “promote peace and stability” 
through “incidental benefits” such as construction projects that serve in “strengthening 
local government infrastructure and accelerating national growth.”73  Articles in 
contemporary American military journals provided explanations for the connection 
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between military construction projects and promoting peace and stability.74  The states 
selected to host Humanitarian/Civic Action projects were economically developing 
countries.  Such projects were theorized to support security because they removed the 
adverse conditions, such as the lack of roads and medical care, that insurgent elements 
exploit.  Furthermore, since the project would provide a benefit to the local population it 
would enhance the legitimacy of the government.  
Plans for the U.S. exercise in Ecuador underwent a dramatic change following the 
major earthquake of 5 March 1997.  The initial arrangement would have had the first 
Army engineer project in South America improve a twelve-kilometer road near the 
coastal town of Manta, Ecuador.  But after the ships with the heavy equipment and 
supplies had already left port a decision was made to move the exercise location across 
the Andes, over two hundred kilometers inland, to assist in earthquake recovery.  The 
plans to improve a road near a coastal resort had been shifted to constructing a road in the 
more challenging environment of the Amazon jungle.     
Evaluated on the basis of the training objective, the exercise was a success.  
Approximately 60,000 unarmed soldiers received training that enhanced unit readiness.  
Plans had been adjusted, the logistical challenge of moving heavy equipment across the 
Andes was accomplished, 6,000 dump truck loads of rock had been laid out as the floor 
for a base camp, the troops were well fed and remained healthy, construction techniques 
were learned from the Ecuadorean engineers, and lessons learned were submitted so that 
more suitable equipment and procedures could be incorporated in doctrine.   
The secondary objective, to benefit the community, also appeared to be met. A 
300 foot bridge now spanned the Rio Hollin, five kilometers of road had been upgraded, 
water and electricity were restored to a hospital, local people received medical and dental 
care, school desks were built, thousands of animals had been vaccinated by veterinarians, 
and local merchants had prospered.75  The majority of the people who lived in the 
vicinity of Archidona, the town closest to where the base camp was set up, were pleased 
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with the American efforts.  However, the response in the capital city of Quito was far 
from favorable.  Objections to the American military presence, which was suspected of 
being a precursor to military operations against guerillas or intervention in Ecuador, were 
sounded in the Ecuadorean Congress even before the exercise began and culminated in a 
demand for immediate withdrawal on 16 July.76  On the same day the Constitutional 
Guarantees Tribunal criticized the President and Foreign Minister for violating the 
constitution in allowing the American troops into the country.77  Rather than supporting 
the legitimacy of the government, the circumstances involving the exercise resulted in a 
political crisis for the Ecuadorean President. 
2. American Interagency Coordination 
Military humanitarian assistance exercises require the coordination of a number of 
federal government organizations at different levels that have different mandates.  The 
basic flow of a proposal for military humanitarian assistance is fairly simple.  Having 
obtained the host nation’s approval, the American ambassador nominates a project to the 
Combatant Commander, who forwards it to the Office of Global Affairs in the 
Department of Defense.  The request is reviewed and sent to the State Department for 
approval.  In the middle 1980s a number of problems complicated the process including 
the absence of clear policy from the Defense Department and the incompatibility of 
military infrastructure projects with the policies of the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID).  In the case of exercise Opening Roads, an 
additional difficulty was the earthquake. 
 One of the major aspects of interagency coordination in planning an overseas 
military exercise was determining the required authorization and appropriate funding for 
the programs involved.  A special incentive for these efforts materialized in 1984 when 
the General Accounting Office recommended that the State Department reimburse the 
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Defense Department for humanitarian assistance activities it conducted in Honduras.78  
The judgment was that the military did not have the authorization to conduct 
humanitarian assistance except on behalf of or incidental to supporting the State 
Department or USAID.79   
A continuing appropriation for the Defense Department that same year, and in the 
years following, gave the military the authority to use its funds for humanitarian and civil 
assistance when they were “incidental to authorized operations.”80  Coordination 
remained a requirement, even when only Defense funds were used, because military 
projects had to “complement social and economic assistance provided by other U.S. 
departments or agencies.”81  The continuing appropriation of 1985 had specified that the 
operations had to be “Joint Chiefs of Staff sponsored and coordinated.”82  Whether this 
applied in later years would be an area of disagreement.  
In the absence of guidance from the Defense Department, interpretations of the 
requirements for humanitarian assistance led to variations in the policies of the regional 
Combatant Commanders.  In 1987 the policy in Southern Command was that in the 
course of an exercise, if the majority of the benefits of a program, such as medical 
assistance, went to the host country, the host country had to pay for that part of the 
program.83  As a result the government of Ecuador provided funding for the medical 
assistance given to the community during the exercise.84   
Interagency coordination for humanitarian/civic assistance was conducted in two 
stages separated by Ecuador’s earthquake.  In the first stage the principal participants 
from the U.S. country team were Ambassador Fernando Rondon and the Commander of 
the Military Group, Colonel Paul Scharf.  Rondon proposed to the President of Ecuador 
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Febres Cordero that American military forces build a road in Ecuador.  With Cordero’s 
enthusiastic agreement, planning began.  Colonel Frank. N. Sefton, III, the Commander 
of Task Force 1169 which was scheduled to conduct the exercise, and key members of 
his staff visited Ecuador.85  The Task Force staff coordinated plans with representatives 
of the country team.  The details for the exercise were set forth in a Memorandum of 
Understanding signed by the Minister of Defense of Ecuador and the Commander of the 
United States Military Group in February 1987, three months before the exercise was to 
begin.86 
From my reading there are no references to USAID’s involvement in the process 
during the initial planning stages for the exercise.  A General Accounting Office report in 
1993 observed “minimal program coordination between the U.S. military and the U.S. 
embassies and AID mission” in the two countries they visited.87  In an article that 
addressed the relations between USAID and military humanitarian assistance in 1985, 
Craig Smith pointed to the incompatibilities of their policies.  The military focused on 
training, building infrastructure projects, and required the host government to fund 
programs that mainly were of benefit to the people.  On the other hand, USAID did not 
want to be identified with the military, focused on development to the exclusion of large 
construction projects, and funded its own programs that were of benefit to the people.88  
With the exception of USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the 
military and USAID did not have much interaction. 
The earthquakes in March and the resulting landslides and flooding resulted in 
about a thousand deaths, the destruction of 60,000 homes, and damage to the Trans-
Ecuadorean oil pipeline as well as the roads that connected the eastern provinces to the 
rest of the nation.89  The economic costs included the closing of oil production, the 
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source of about two thirds of the nation’s export earnings, and the isolation of Napo 
province to the degree that costly air transport was the principal means of providing food 
to the inhabitants.  President Cordero requested assistance from foreign nations for the 
relief and reconstruction efforts. 
American assistance came immediately following the request and personnel from 
the OFDA and the military augmented the country team.  In addition to noting the 
American provision of the airlift of emergency food and shelter, the OFDA Annual 
Report for 1987 states that on 9 March the government of Ecuador requested American 
assistance in “reopening a route and replacing washed out bridges” in Eastern Napo 
Province.90  There were two major possibilities.  The first was to repair the road that 
paralleled the pipeline and the second involved completing a road, south of the pipeline, 
that the Ecuadorean Army Corps of Engineers under the direction of the Ecuadorian 
Ministry of Public Works had begun prior to the earthquake.91  A survey of the area 
conducted by U.S. Army engineers recommended that the latter route be worked on.  
OFDA accepted the recommendation and funded sixteen bridges at a cost of $ 2.5 
million.92 
The plan for OFDA to support the Ecuadorean Ministry of Public Works project 
changed following the 22 March meeting between the American Vice-President and the 
President of Ecuador.  Cordero approved Bush’s proposal to move the Opening Roads 
exercise from the coast to Napo Province.93  The road to be constructed during the 
exercise was further south than the one being constructed by the Ministry of Public 
Works and OFDA decided to shift the bridges, which had not been installed, to support 
the exercise.94  The decision to shift the bridges to the exercise road agreed with the legal 
requirement that humanitarian assistance could not duplicate or compete with other 
American funded projects.  In light of problems with the exercise road and the objective 
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of providing the bridges to reopen a route in Napo Province, OFDA eventually 
reallocated the uninstalled bridges back to the Ministry of Public Works road. 
3. Host Nation Participation 
Host nation participation in the planning and execution of the project was 
concentrated in the Ecuadorean President and military both before and after the 
earthquake.  President Cordero and Ambassador Rondon agreed on the initial concept of 
having American military forces train in Ecuador and the Ecuadorean Minister of 
Defense and the U.S. Military Group Commander worked out the details without the 
involvement of the Ecuadorean Foreign Ministry.  The Memorandum of Understanding, 
which included the American agreement to work on road construction as well as provide 
medical and educational assistance to the local population, also exempted the American 
military participants and their equipment from the normal customs requirements.  Heavy 
equipment, including Blackhawk helicopters, need not go through customs and the 
soldiers did not require passports. 
After the earthquake, President Cordero established a national Emergency 
Committee for the direction of disaster assistance.  However, in the remote provinces, 
informal networks emerged among organizations that dealt with specific problems.  The 
four agencies involved in road construction in Eastern Napo Province were the 
“Ecuadorian Army Corps of Engineers, the Ecuadorian Ministry of Public Works, the 
USAID/OFDA, and the U.S. Military Group in Ecuador.”95  However, coordination for 
the Blazing Trails exercise road was primarily made between the Ecuadorean Army 
Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Military Group.  Organizations that were excluded from 
coordination, including   the Ministry of Public Works, the Ecuadorean Congress, and the 
indigenous organization Confederacion de Nacionalidades Indigenas del Ecuador 
(CONAIE), were critical of the exercise. 
The expectations of Ecuadorean government officials involved in the planning of 
the exercise did not fully correspond with American objectives.  Given the number of 
troops and amount of heavy equipment involved, it was anticipated that the Americans 
would be able to open a route connecting the isolated Napo Province with the existing 
roads in the west.  The minimal expectation was that a road would be constructed that                                                  
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connected the towns of Hollin, Loreto, and Coca.96  However, the rotation of reservists 
and the challenges of the environment meant that the tangible results of the training 
exercise were far more modest.  The exclusion of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and 
Public Works in planning and the disparity in expectations and the results of the 
American exercise contributed to the contentious political climate.      
4. Local Political Conditions 
An indicator of political instability was that President Cordero carried a .45 
caliber pistol in his belt.97  The second President to be elected since the nation’s 
transition from military rule, Cordero ushered in a series of neoliberal economic reforms, 
including debt repayment, with the attendant austerity measures.  His support for 
President Ronald Reagan’s political and economic programs brought in U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Agency support and an increase in development assistance.  Cordero’s 
economic and foreign policy, along with the strong exercise of executive authority, faced 
strong domestic opposition. 
Military opposition centered on General Frank Vargas, the Chief of the Air Force.  
Vargas had publicly denounced members of Cordero’s administration for accepting 
bribes when making aircraft purchases.  The government responded by ordering Vargas 
to retire and he retaliated by staging a mutiny in March 1986.  After the mutiny was 
suppressed, the Ecuadorean Congress voted that amnesty be extended to Vargas and the 
rebels.  
Cordero, who had ignored the Congressional amnesty, was kidnapped and beaten 
by rebel Air Force personnel in January 1987.98  The center-left coalition that controlled 
congress responded during the kidnapping by urging the Vice-President to assume power 
and to refuse to negotiate with the kidnappers.99  Cordero secured his own release by 
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signing an amnesty.  Subsequently, since the opposition in Congress did not have enough 
votes for impeachment, it passed a non-binding resolution calling for his resignation. 
Two months after the abduction the earthquakes hit.  A political truce was briefly 
in effect between the government and the opposition but quickly deteriorated.  Given the 
loss of oil production the government implemented further austerity measures that it 
deemed necessary, including a decrease in gasoline subsidies and fuel rationing.100   
The tensions that existed between the government and the opposition carried over 
to the American military exercise.  The opposition distrusted the administration and also 
the United States, which was seen as the promoter of painful economic reforms as well as 
military interventions that violated the sovereignty of Latin American states, was 
worsened by the government’s failure to provide transparency to the military exercise.  
While a spokesman for the Ecuadorean military was able to respond to a reporter’s 
question with a statement on the U.S. Army engineers’ plan to provide Ecuadorean Army 
engineers with training, the Defense Under Secretariat reported that it was unaware of 
such a proposal.101  More significantly, it took the Ecuadorean Defense Ministry over 
three months to answer a congressional request for information on why American troops 
would be coming to Ecuador.102   
Speculation by the opposition on American intentions in the isolated Eastern 
Napo Province ranged from the establishment of a base for military operations to the 
extraction of mineral deposits.  Those who suspected that a military base was being 
constructed varied in what they thought the purpose would be.  Some thought that it 
would be a U.S. military base for operations against guerillas in neighboring countries, or 
against Ecuador in the event a leftist government won the upcoming elections.103  While 
such speculations fueled lively debates, the grounds for the congressional resolution 
demanding the departure of the American troops was that their presence violated national 
sovereignty. Despite the Ecuadorean congressional resolution and further censure of 
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presidential policy by the “Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees,” Cordero did not break 
the terms of the memorandum and the U.S. forces remained until the agreed upon 
departure date.104 
B. ANALYSIS IN LIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
Evaluation of the exercise’s promotion of human rights will examine the areas of 
objectives, interagency coordination, and host nation participation. 
1. Objectives 
In a rights based approach to development assistance, the objectives would 
support the host country in working towards its goal of providing “equality of 
opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, education, health services, food, 
housing, employment and the fair distribution of income.”105  Even given the constraints 
on HCA to focus on training, it may have been possible for the residual benefits of the 
exercise to have supported such goals.  The modification that was made to the exercise 
project, reconnecting an area of the country isolated by earthquake damage instead of 
constructing a coastal road to foster tourism, brought the project closer to one based on 
human rights.   
However, the selection of the U.S. Army’s project in the Napo Province of 
Ecuador had a number of problems.  The first was that it pulled resources away from the 
road being constructed by the Ecuadorean Ministry of Public Works.  That project, which 
had been evaluated favorably by U.S. Army Engineers, had been under construction and 
was scheduled to receive bridges funded by OFDA.106  This commitment was altered as 
the bridges were transferred to the Blazing Trails road when it was announced that the 
exercise road would be further to the south.107        
Another problem was that the scope of the project was impossible to complete 
given the training requirements and the amount of time available.  The Task Force 
Commander acknowledged this when he said, “Our primary goal is training – but the host 
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nation’s expectations are that we will complete some major construction.”108  The 
misunderstanding appeared to exist not only with the host but also the senior American 
officials that initiated the project.  Had the exercise been conducted in conjunction with 
the Ministry of Public Works project, it would have been a more supportive and 
collaborative undertaking.   
2. Interagency Coordination 
Planning for sustainable development is needed to avoid dependence on aid 
providers, which results in wasted effort and reduces the local people to merely aid 
recipients instead of active participants in their development.  In 1988 Colonel John 
Schaufelberger, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, identified a number of planning 
principles for civic action projects that promote sustainable development.109  He 
emphasizes the training of local people to “develop in-country expertise . . . in operation 
and maintenance . . . engineering and construction,” the use of locally procured materials 
to support the local economy and ensure maintainability, and the overarching goal of 
“useful facilities and improved host nation capabilities.”110  Unfortunately, the 
application of such principles was not apparent in many civic assistance projects carried 
out in the 1980s. 
A report by the General Accounting Office in 1994 noted the absence of planning 
for sustainable development in “some of the Southern Command’s infrastructure 
projects” which “did not consider the host nation’s ability to maintain them” with the 
result that “some of the buildings and roads were not used.”111  A specific example was 
that “hundreds of miles of road in Honduras and Panama” constructed by U.S. Army 
National Guard and Reserve soldiers from the 1980s “had not been maintained and 
sections had either eroded or washed away making the roads virtually impassable.”112    
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If the interagency process had been stronger, if USAID had been involved in 
planning the exercise, would sustainability and other principles in agreement with a rights 
approach to development have been incorporated in the planning and execution of the 
exercise?  In 1988 USAID’s development policies favored market reform, privatization, 
and the promotion of democratic values such as “participatory development, the 
protection of human rights, and the strengthening of political and legal institutions.”113  
Taken as a general statement, it might seem that a stronger interagency process would 
have brought these democratic values into the exercise.  A review of the specific USAID 
goals and programs at the time for the region suggest that the gains would have been 
more modest.   The promotion of democracy involved assisting the economic stability in 
“fledgling Andean democracies” through balance of payments assistance and reinforcing 
the judicial systems through training programs.114  Other objectives for the region 
included improving health services, increasing agricultural production, and providing 
alternative programs for those involved in narcotics production. 
Based on USAID practices at the time, had it been involved more in the planning 
of the exercise it is possible that sustainability could have been incorporated into the 
exercise.  As a contracting agency, USAID could have established agreements for road 
maintenance, as it had done with private enterprises in Costa Rica, or the provision of 
health care in West Napo Province, with arrangements similar to those it had made with 
Project Hope in Grenada.115  Minimally, a stronger interagency process may have placed 
an emphasis on providing vaccination records to local clinics, and fostered coordination 
of the exercise with a wider range of representatives of the host nation. 
3. Host Nation Participation 
The inclusion of local people and service providers is essential in planning.  Their 
insights on local conditions and capacities, identification of needs, and commitment to 
maintaining the project are important in ensuring that the project assists in the long-term 
development of the people.  A rights approach to development cooperation keeps in mind 
that the outsiders who come in to offer support must respect the people and their 
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institutions, traditions, and goals.  It also sees the “mutually reinforcing interrelationship 
between development, democracy and human rights” and strives for shared decision 
making, “dialogue and transparency.”116  It involves members of the local population, 
including women, the poor, and indigenous persons, as well as grass roots organizations 
and non-governmental organizations in the planning and decision making process.117  
Local government officials, particularly those who would be maintaining the project once 
it has been completed, are also involved.   
How could such an approach have entered in to the planning of the exercise?  
There was a network of indigenous and religious organizations that were active in the 
region where the exercise took place that included CONAIE, Catholic Relief Services, 
and an Evangelical mission.118  In addition to the Ecuadorean Army Corps of Engineers, 
which served as the principal host nation liaison for the exercise, the provincial 
government and the Ministry of Public Works were governmental entities active in the 
region and Congress had responsibilities to the region as well.  A rights approach would 
not have left dialogue as an option but made it an integral part of the planning process.  
Had contact been made with members of these organizations that led to their participation 
in the planning, the exercise could have been tailored to assist the local people in 
addressing their needs and the increased transparency might have reduced the suspicion 
and opposition that surrounded Opening Roads. 
In the late planning stages, dialogue with the Ministry of Public Works might 
have led to a combined effort on their road or at least not diverting the bridges.  On a 
smaller scale, with input from the local people, the location and design of the camp set up 
for the exercise could have been arranged so that once the exercise was over it would be 
useful to the local population.  The earlier a dialogue had been established, the easier it 
would have been to adjust the plans to address local needs. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
Exercise Opening Roads, while assessed as a success by the Task Force that 
executed it, contributed to the volatile domestic political climate in Ecuador.  The 
interagency process concentrated on allowing the exercise to take place rather than 
coordinating the efforts of the Task Force with the objectives of USAID.  Host nation 
participation in the planning was concentrated in senior government officials and the 
Ecuadorean Army Corps of Engineers to the exclusion of the Foreign and Public Works 
Ministries, regional governments, Congress, and local organizations.  The lack of 
transparency fostered suspicion about the real American objectives.   
While the dispute between the executive and legislative branches in Ecuador 
would not have been solved by a human rights approach to the planning of the exercise, it 
could have avoided contributing to them.  By allowing locally identified needs to guide 
project selection, broadening the dialogue with local organizations and service providers, 
and working towards sustainable development, the Task Force would have been able to 
both provide transparency to its objectives and maximize its contribution to Ecuador’s 
development.  
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IV. EXERCISE NEW HORIZONS – NICARAGUA 1999 
A. INTRODUCTION 
American military involvement in Nicaragua in the twentieth century had taken 
the form of armed interventions and occupations, support for military regimes noted for 
their corruption and human rights abuses, and from 1980 to 1988, sponsorship of the 
contras against the Sandinista government in a civil war with over 30,000 mortal 
casualties.  When Nicaragua established a democratic government in 1990, the 
Sandinistas remained a powerful political force as the party with the second highest 
number of seats in the unicameral National Assembly.  An opportunity for a turning point 
in American relations with Nicaragua came in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 
October 1998.  The United States mounted a relief effort in the region of unprecedented 
scale involving over 5,000 military and civilian personnel and a budget of $ 312 million.  
However, delays in the American response and a weak public affairs program gave 
disproportionately higher recognition to the relatively minor contributions of other states, 
such as Mexico.119    
During the rescue and relief stage, from October to December 1998, the 
Nicaraguan people received the American military’s assistance with surprise and 
appreciation.  But as the floods ebbed and the hurricane recovery stage began in January 
1999, the previously latent animosity towards the American military held by many in 
Nicaragua resurfaced.  One village rejected the offer of medical assistance by American 
military personnel in January as its people shouted “Yankees out of Nicaragua” and 
“Here and there, dead Yankees everywhere.”120  President Bill Clinton’s visit to the 
region in March was followed by unrest in the capital city of Managua as the leading  
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Nicaraguan newspaper reported that Clinton manifested “only hope and distrust” to 
Nicaragua while “dollars and expressions of cordial relations” were extended to 
neighboring Honduras.121   
It was in this setting that the American military was finalizing its plans to extend 
its Central American Humanitarian and Civic Assistance program, New Horizons, to 
Nicaragua.  The exercise was scheduled to be conducted between 5 May and mid August 
1999 in an impoverished region that had been seriously effected by the hurricane.  The 
same region, in the vicinity of Esteli in northern Nicaragua, was the birthplace of the 
Sandinista movement, where hostility towards the American military had been handed on 
by generations who fought American or pro-American forces from the 1920s through the 
1980s.   
Given the inveterate antipathy held by many in Nicaragua, particularly in Esteli, it 
may seem surprising that exercise New Horizon was largely successful.  While there was 
a delay in commencing the exercise, it demonstrated goodwill and fostered amicable 
relations with Nicaragua.  This chapter will discuss the objectives, interagency process, 
host nation coordination, and local political conditions that were involved in the outcome.  
Then a comparison between this project and a human rights based program will be made.   
1. Objectives 
The objective for New Horizons 99, as reported by the Defense Department to the 
General Accounting Office, was a direct reflection of the statutory requirement, 
identifying the primary purpose as improving readiness with incidental benefits to the 
host nation.122  On the other hand, an official Defense Department news release identified 
the goal of New Horizons 99 as “helping our neighbors progress on their road to 
recovery.”123  A more complete presentation of the exercise objectives requires 
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considering the current standard operating procedures in Southern Command as well as 
the practices of Army Civil Affairs officers. 
The objectives for exercise New Horizons – Nicaragua in 1999 set by U.S. 
Southern Command incorporated the statutory requirements for Humanitarian Civic 
Assistance in a framework that recognized that nearly every aspect of the exercise 
involved enhancing the readiness of the forces involved.  A wide range of explicit 
strategic and operational objectives were delineated in the standard operating procedures 
that expanded the training to include not only unit leaders, logisticians, engineers, and 
medical personnel in the traditional tasks involved in mobilization, deployment, 
construction, the provision of medical assistance, and redeployment, but unit leaders and 
those in the civil and public affairs specialties in the provision of humanitarian assistance 
and fostering regional relations. 
In providing humanitarian assistance the strategic level training objectives 
included meeting the conditions of interoperability, foreign government support, and 
supportive foreign public opinion.124  The corresponding standards included having all of 
the “units trained to perform HCA activities,” half of the “project effort provided by host 
nation personnel,” full completion of planned and funded projects, and all of the projects 
being “deemed to be a long term investment” that would be estimated to continue to 
“have pay off five years after completion.”125  As will be discussed below, project 
viability and sustainability were significant planning factors. 
An operational level objective of providing public affairs included the standard of 
having all “requests for information from organizations and private citizens answered” 
and the objective of fostering regional relations included a standard of interagency 
involvement.126  The Commander of Joint Task Force Esteli, Lieutenant Colonel Alan 
Rogers of the 216th Engineer Battalion, Ohio National Guard, was fully conscious of the  
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strategic objectives of the exercise:  “We know what we do will help determine relations 
between the two countries . . . We are building more than just roads and schools.  We’re 
building trust.”127 
As the objectives including fostering regional relations, they also addressed 
enhancing the host nation’s economy.  In the opinion of Major Robert Crowley, the 
United States Army Civil Affairs officer who served as the Southern Command 
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Coordinator, “The training value to deployed U.S. 
forces is of statutory importance equal to that of improving host nation economic and 
social sectors.”128  To meet the standard of project sustainability within the constraints of 
a lack of either training and equipment resources or the authorization for the military to 
provide them, Civil Affairs officers incorporated the innovation of establishing 
cooperative relationships with non-governmental organizations.  Major Crowley worked 
extensively with the Florida Association of Volunteer Agencies for Caribbean Action 
(FAVA/CA) to enhance the HCA conducted in New Horizons-Nicaragua 1999 by 
arriving at a plan for the training and equipping of local medical personnel that would 
staff the clinic that was to be constructed.129  Collaboration with non-governmental 
organizations became an integral component of project sustainability. 
The objectives for the exercise, which involved the construction of a road, clinics, 
and schools by National Guard and reserve forces in Nicaragua during its hurricane 
recovery stage in 1999 included not only enhancing the readiness of logisticians, 
engineers and medical personnel.  It also involved unit leaders as well as civil and public 
affairs specialists in their ability to provide humanitarian assistance and foster regional 
relations as set forth in the Southern Command Training Objectives.  The introduction of 
cooperative relationships with non-governmental organizations facilitated attainment of 
the previously unattainable aspect of project sustainability. 
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2. American Interagency Coordination 
American interagency coordination for Exercise New Horizons – Nicaragua 1999 
was built on the foundations of recent military experiences with and commitments to an 
interagency process as well as the working relationships that had been established in 
Nicaragua immediately following the hurricane.  This resulted in the involvement of the 
country team, including United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
representatives and embassy public affairs personnel, in many aspects of planning and 
executing the exercise.  Because Department of State and USAID personnel were 
integrated in the planning process, this section will also review their region and state 
specific goals and their impact on the planning of New Horizons.   
In the post Cold War relief and peacekeeping operations, military commanders, 
civil affairs officers, and operations officers had routinely dealt with the challenges of 
coordinating intergovernmental, governmental, military, and non-governmental 
organizations activities.  The emphasis placed by the Department of Defense on civil-
military coordination was evident in the establishment of the Center for Hemispheric 
Defense in 1997 for the training of civilian professionals in defense matters and the 
United States Pacific Command’s Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and 
Humanitarian Assistance that provided training for both military and civilian personnel.  
Within Southern Command personal experiences with civil-military coordination was in 
the profile of its Commander in Chief, General Charles E. Wilhelm, United States Marine 
Corps, who had served as the Commander of Marine Forces, Somalia, during Operation 
Restore Hope and Major Crowley had been the Chief of Current Operations for the 
Combined-Joint Civil-Military Coordination Center at the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization’s Implementation Forces Headquarters in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
In addition to the background of individuals, Southern Command worked towards 
incorporating institutional memory as well as training in interagency responses to 
disasters and humanitarian assistance when it established the Center for Disaster 
Management and Humanitarian Assistance in 1998.130  While the Center’s training  
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efforts did not predate the planning for New Horizons-Nicaragua 1999, its existence 
points to the importance given to civil-military collaboration by Southern Command 
since 1998.    
Southern Command’s “Civil Affairs Guidance” that was current during Hurricane 
Mitch required the coordination of operations and their prioritization, with an emphasis 
on enhancing long term development, through embassy offices as well as host nation 
agencies.131  Measures were taken in multiple levels of command to facilitate interaction 
between civilian and military leaders and advisors.  A prime example of this was the 
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance’s provision of liaison officers at Southern 
Command headquarters and in each Military Group participating in the hurricane 
relief.132 
In the subordinate command in Nicaragua, Task Force Build Hope the operations 
officer, Major Jeff Eckstein, described high levels of interagency coordination.  
Representatives from the Task Force participated in “weekly meetings of the country 
team and reconstruction team at the embassy” as well as “working groups [that] included 
Nicaraguan officials, embassy personnel, task force staff, and non governmental 
organizations.”133  Coordination between the participants brought a wealth of experience 
and points of contact to the military planners, reconciled unrealistic host nation 
expectations with the parameters of American military assistance and engaged the 
capacities of the embassy’s public affairs staff.  The public affairs program included the 
Task Force Commander’s participation in “press conferences held by the Nicaraguan 
government at the start and completion of every mission” and arranging for the local 
media to visit the mission sites.134  
Planning for exercise New Horizons in Central America involved a six-year cycle 
and did not include scheduling projects in Nicaragua until after Hurricane Mitch.  The 
short lead-time meant that working groups for New Horizons-Nicaragua 1999 met during 
                                                 
131 Melinda Hofstetter, Building Alliances Amidst Destruction: A Status Report from Hurricane Mitch.  
Discussion Paper No. 9.  (Washington, D.C.: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2000),  19.   
132 Ibid., 13. 
133 Jeff Eckstein.  “Operation Fuerte Apoyo: Disaster Relief in Nicaragua.”  Available online: 
www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs99/a  Accessed 4 March 2004.  3. 
134 Ibid., 6. 
43 
the relief stage and relied heavily on members of the country team from the State 
Department as well as USAID.  Because the goal involved not only avoiding duplicating 
other efforts by the American government but also supporting the country plan, a review 
of U.S. foreign policy priorities in the region is in order.  Among the hemispheric 
objectives the State Department identified were “linking disaster relief and humanitarian 
assistance with development cooperation” and improving “equity of access to basic 
packages of health care through improved health care systems and sustainability” 
provided by non-governmental organizations and the public sector.135  A specific 
objective for health in Nicaragua was “focus[ing] on improving access to health care 
among the poor.”136  State Department Counselor, Ambassador Wendy Sherman, 
emphasized the encouragement being given to Nicaragua to provide transparency as a 
safeguard against corruption and include “local governments and non-governmental 
organizations” in the decentralized planning for the provision of services.137   
In terms of policy, Department of State members of the country team had 
considerable influence on the exercise, particularly the American Ambassador to 
Nicaragua, Lino Guttierez who had final authority.  However, because the exercise 
involved the provision of assistance, U.S. military planners dealt more extensively with 
USAID members of the team.  That USAID and Task Force New Horizons had a strong 
working relationship was supported by references to this in the Congressional 
Presentation and a statement by the U.S. delegation to the Consultative Group on the 
Reconstruction and Transformation of Central America.138   
USAID policies supported and further specified the objectives established by the 
State Department in the Annual Performance Plan, Congressional Presentation, and 
official statements.  The USAID Annual Performance Plan’s Strategic Goal addressing 
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“lives saved, suffering associated with actual or man-made disasters reduced, and 
conditions for political and/or economic development reestablished” called for the 
“reestablish[ment] of security, and basic institutions to meet critical needs and basic 
rights.”139  Discussion of the goal included the following observation: 
Improving U.S. assistance to transition countries has required USAID to 
link emergency relief to longer-term development activities.  Relief 
programs are increasingly incorporating the development principles of 
capacity building, participation, and sustainability to accelerate 
reestablishment of people’s livelihood and self-sufficiency.140 
The section of the subsequent budget request justification dealing with Nicaragua 
identified a special focus on the “geographical area most affected by Mitch, which also 
coincides with the area of highest level of poverty” and the goals of strengthening 
“democracy, economic growth, health, and education” through programs that involved 
the participation of civil society and the decentralization of government services.141  
Indeed the effort was to give “renewed attention to the participation of all people . . . in 
the rebuilding of their communities and the nation” and to “ensure that the maximum 
amount of assistance goes through local governments to the community level.”142  
The principles of focusing aid on the least advantaged, planning for sustainability, 
capacity building, and community participation were incorporated in the planning for 
exercise New Horizons-Nicaragua 1999.  After coordinating the elements of the exercise 
that focused on the Army’s direct contribution in construction of a road, schools, and 
clinic in a disadvantaged rural region that had been hard hit by the hurricane, meetings 
and site visits were scheduled for the portion of the project that was to be executed by a 
private volunteer organization.  Representatives from Southern Command, the State of 
Florida, and FAVA/CA made a trip from Florida to Nicaragua in March 1999.  The group 
visited the planned site and “conducted initial coordination with the local Ministry of 
Health representative to identify needs that FAVA/CA can fill in support of the planned 
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HCA projects.”143  Subsequent meetings with the Deputy Chief of Mission and the 
USAID Director were also positive and reflected a consensus that FAVA/CA’s 
partnership with Southern Command would “improve the long term viability and 
sustainability of our HCA projects.”144   
During the trip preliminary plans for the partnership were drafted.  FAVA/CA 
would send teams, supported by the Task Force, to Nicaragua to identify training and 
equipment needs.  A training plan and equipment lists would be developed, and 
solicitations for trainers and equipment donations would be made in Florida.  Southern 
Command would coordinate the delivery of donated goods and FAVA/CA would send 
volunteers to conduct the training.  In August of 1999 FAVA/CA provided the training to 
staff at the clinics that had been built during New Horizons.145  The partnership with 
Southern Command was based on a “shared vision and solid commitment to sustainable 
human initiatives” that FAVA/CA described as “going beyond traditional military and 
social agency roles in a new team with a human face and a ‘no strings attached 
mentality.”146   
3. Host Nation Participation 
Host nation participation in the planning of the project included national and 
community leaders representing the civilian government, the military, and civil society.  
Nicaraguan President Arnoldo Aleman was receptive to the exercise and the ministries of 
Defense, Foreign Affairs, Health and Education, and Culture were involved in 
coordinating the exercise with the American country team and Southern Command.  The 
Nicaraguan Ministry of Health, which had demonstrated leadership throughout the 
hurricane relief and recovery coordination efforts, was involved in planning the American 
military exercise in Managua as well as in Esteli.147  As previously mentioned, local 
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Ministry of Health officials as well as community members participated in the site survey 
with the group from Florida.  The cooperative planning effort was designed to determine 
whether the project was “supportable by the existing social infrastructure” and to ensure 
that it did not “conflict with traditional customs or patterns.”148     
Continuing with the practices established during the hurricane relief stage, in 
addition to inclusion in the planning process, arrangements were made for the host nation 
to be involved in publicizing the event and conducting a project assessment.  Three days 
after the Government of Nicaragua finalized authorization for the exercise, the United 
States embassy issued a press release that provided transparency to what the American 
military would be doing.149  It identified the exercise, the port of debarkation, the rotation 
plan for the participating reservists, the amount of equipment that was going to be 
brought in, the sites for the exercise, the type of assistance that was going to be provided 
and the completion date.  It also listed the four Nicaraguan ministries that had been 
involved in coordinating the event.  The American Ambassador also conducted a press 
conference at the site, accompanied by the Nicaraguan Ministers of Defense and 
Education as well as the Nicaraguan Army Chief of Staff, on 4 June 1999.150  
Ambassador Gutierrez’s remarks acknowledged that the exercise marked a new chapter 
in relations between the two countries with assistance deemed appropriate and facilitated 
by the Nicaraguan government. 
Host nation participation was marked by coordination in planning and public 
affairs at the national and local levels.  This facilitated consideration of the concerns of 
the Nicaraguan government and recognition for their contributions.  The principal 
challenge for the host nation was in authorizing the presence of American military forces, 
which was the result of partisan politics. 
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4. Local Political Conditions 
The political dispute over whether or not to authorize the American military to 
conduct its humanitarian assistance exercise centered on two political figures in 
Nicaraguan politics, President Aleman and the leader of the Sandinista party, Daniel 
Ortega.  Aleman, the second president to be elected since the post-Sandinista 
government, had been a long time political adversary of the Sandinistas.  Hostility 
towards Aleman marked his inauguration when a former Sandinista security official 
attempted an assassination.  While not carrying out acts of violence, Ortega had hinted at 
the Sandinistas taking up arms against the government in April of 1998 and 1999.151  The 
event that prompted the most recent threat was the death of two strikers at the hands of 
police during a national transportation worker’s strike.  The government responded to the 
disorder with a strengthened police presence in the cities and the deployment of 5,000 
soldiers to guard sites of strategic significance.  It was under these circumstances that 
debate on ratifying the Presidential Decree authorizing a foreign military presence for 
humanitarian reasons “under the control of the Nicaraguan Army,” as required by the 
Constitution, took place.152 
Debate in the National Assembly continued past the planned starting date for the 
exercise of 5 May, and was not resolved until 11 May.  It was a “deep ideological debate 
between the Liberals and the Sandinistas.”153  Ortega, who had expressed appreciation 
for the American military effort during the relief stage, returned to the rhetoric he voiced 
when the offer of American assistance had been made.  He claimed that American 
soldiers would conduct espionage, spread the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, and 
take jobs away from Nicaraguans.154  A principal proponent of the American exercise 
was the former Sandinista and current Army Chief of Staff, General Joaquin Cuadra.  His  
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initial skepticism towards offers of American military assistance was dispelled by his 
experience with the forces during the relief stage and his involvement in planning the 
exercise.155   
The National Assembly’s ratification stipulated the degree of control that would 
be exercised by the Nicaraguan Army and the terms that would be used to describe the 
American forces.   To assert national sovereignty, the Nicaraguan Army would place 
“three rings of security around the base camp” and an armed escort in every American 
military vehicle leaving the camp.156  In addition, the American National Guard Units 
were not to be called “National Guard” because of the name’s connotations with 
Somoza’s forces.157  The ratification was announced approvingly by the press because it 
observed the rule of law, was an expression of American “solidarity with the people” that 
would provide “roads, schools and clinics.”158  
B. ANALYSIS IN LIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
This section will provide a definition of human rights and analyze the extent to 
which exercise New Horizons-Nicaragua 1999 promoted human rights.  Evaluation of 
New Horizons-Nicaragua’s promotion of human rights will examine the four areas of 
objectives, interagency coordination, host nation participation, and local political 
conditions.   
1. Objectives 
In a rights based approach to development assistance, the exercise objectives 
would be based on collaborative planning that supported the host country in working 
towards its goal of providing “equality of opportunity for all in their access to basic 
resources, education, health services, food, housing, employment and the fair distribution 
of income.”159  While the Nicaraguan government had not formalized its human 
development goals it was making progress in this area.  It had applied for a grant from the 
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United Nations Development Program to fund a Human Development Report that would 
specify national goals and assist in developing plans to attain them.160  Two documents 
that indicated human development priorities were the Constitution and the charter of the 
Social Protection Net.  The Nicaraguan Constitution had been amended in November of 
1994 to guarantee the “rights of primary and secondary education and free health care for 
all citizens.”161  The Social Protection Net, which was to be funded by the Inter-
American Development Bank, would assist poor families through improving health and 
education services in the most impoverished areas.162  
The emergent requirements due to damage brought by Hurricane Mitch included 
“water and sanitation systems, health facilities and schools.”163  While not in a 
comprehensive manner, Exercise New Horizon addressed these needs by constructing 
schools, health clinics, and wells.  Most importantly, with the exception of the need for 
housing, American governmental assistance addressed needs identified by the host 
nation.164 
2. Interagency Process 
The American interagency process that was implemented during the planning for 
the exercise gave emphasis to a number of principles that are congruent with a human 
rights approach to development.  The operative principles included sustainability, 
coordination with national and local host nation service providers, “equity of access” to 
basic services, capacity building, participation, and transparency.165  The inclusion of 
local people and service providers is essential in planning but absent the goal of 
promoting sustainable development can lead to dependence.  Their insights on local 
conditions and capacities, identification of needs, and commitment to maintaining the 
project are important in ensuring that the project assists in the long-term development of 
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the people.  Planning for sustainable development is needed to avoid dependence on aid 
providers, which results in wasted effort and reduces the local people to merely aid 
recipients instead of active participants in their development.  Through the partnership 
with FAVA/CA, which provided equipment and training for the medical staff, the project 
was able to incorporate both sustainability and capacity building in its medical 
component.  Whether there were similar requirements for the schools, wells, and road 
was not addressed in the reports. 
3  Host Nation Participation 
A rights approach to development cooperation keeps in mind that the outsiders 
who come in to offer support must respect the people and their institutions, traditions, and 
goals.  It also sees the “mutually reinforcing interrelationship between development, 
democracy and human rights” and strives for shared decision making, “dialogue and 
transparency.”166  It involves members of the local population, including women, the 
poor, and indigenous persons, as well as grass roots organizations and non-governmental 
organizations in the planning and decision making process.167  Local government 
officials, particularly those who would be maintaining the project once it has been 
completed, would also be involved.   
While coordination with local ministerial representatives was evident, the level of 
participation by local members of civil society during exercise planning, including the 
site visits, was not clear in my research.  Through the public affairs efforts of the embassy 
staff, full details of the project were made known to the Nicaraguan media.  The 
favorable coverage of the exercise in the Nicaraguan media and the cumulative beneficial 
effects of American military assistance, particularly in light of the failure of numerous 
other donors to deliver promised aid, were important to the transparency and desirability 
of the exercise.168 
C. CONCLUSION 
Exercise New Horizons-Nicaragua 1999 demonstrated the potential for American 
military humanitarian assistance to promote the economic human rights of the citizens in 
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the host country.  Developments in civil-military cooperation, particularly the 
coordination of planning by USAID and the U.S. Southern Command and the innovation 
of partnering with private voluntary organizations, provided new exercise objectives and 
planning principles.  A major breakthrough was overcoming the restrictions on the 
transfer of equipment and the provision of training by the military through the partnership 
with the Florida Association of Volunteer Agencies for Caribbean Action.   
Host nation participation in the planning included the national ministries but at 
least in the medical component, was decentralized and focused on the Ministry of Health 
representatives that would actually staff the clinics.  Accountability to these ministries, 
which had evaluated completed projects during the relief stage, continued as a component 
of the military humanitarian and civic assistance program.169  The transparency of the 
project, which was particularly important given the hostility held by many Nicaraguans 
towards the American military, promoted their receptivity towards the exercise. 
While the planning for the exercise may not have envisioned the promotion of 
economic rights as one of its objectives, it did set out to promote the economic 
development of the nation, particularly in the regions with the greatest need.  In the 
planning and execution of the exercise, the participation of the host nation’s service 
providers, sustainable development, transparency, and accountability were operative. 
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V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Opening Roads – Ecuador 1986 and New Horizons – Nicaragua 1999 were 
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance exercises conducted by United States Southern 
Command in the wake of natural disasters.  The statutory guidance for HCA remained 
constant and both cases involved local political conditions in host nations where the 
second democratically elected president welcomed American assistance while, in the 
legislatures, the opposition parties did not favor the presence of the United States 
military.  But there were dissimilarities that contributed to diverging outcomes both in 
terms of effectiveness and the level of agreement with the emerging human rights agenda.   
A. VARIATIONS IN THE CASES   
There were four areas of variation in the cases: (1) strategic environment, (2) 
objectives, (3) interagency process, and (4) level of host nation participation.  The 
strategic environment had changed dramatically from 1986 to 1999.  The twelve years 
that separated the cases were marked by the end of the Cold War and the rising 
significance and incidence of American military operations undertaken for humanitarian 
and peacekeeping purposes to foster stability in such places as Somalia and the Balkans.  
The new mission objectives included ensuring the delivery of food, protecting 
populations that had been displaced by conflict or disaster, and coordinating the provision 
of basic material needs to refugees.  Rather than acting alone, during the planning and 
execution stages of these missions, the military worked in conjunction with 
governmental, intergovernmental, and non-governmental organizations and agencies to 
fulfill the objectives.  Military commanders and their staffs became accustomed to 
working in an interagency process and came to appreciate the capacities of the various 
non-governmental organizations to address certain needs as well as the challenges of 
coordinating their activities.  
In this changed environment, adaptations were made to Southern Command’s 
military exercise and nation assistance programs, including Humanitarian and Civic 
Assistance exercises.  Where the major military exercise programs had emphasized 
bilateral training in “conventional combat scenarios,” in 1995 they shifted to “multilateral 
exercises” involving “peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, counter narco-trafficking, 
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and other more appropriate post-Cold War missions.”170  The principal objectives of 
nation assistance exercises changed, according to Melinda Hofstetter, from “forestall[ing] 
insurgencies” to furthering democratization through civil-military operations with 
“civilian oversight . . . or at least strong [civilian] interaction.”171  The influence of these 
changes on the conduct of HCA exercises was evident both in the policy guidance as well 
as the practices that were developed. 
The objectives for the HCA exercises in Ecuador in 1987 and Nicaragua in 1999 
followed the statutory requirements that the training of American military forces was a 
primary objective and the principal secondary objective was providing residual economic 
benefits to the host nation.  But there were significant differences in the cases as to what 
constituted “training” and the “residual economic benefits” from the exercise to the host 
nation.  In 1987 training centered on developing the unit level skills of engineers in road 
construction and included movement to and from the site as well as maintaining the 
forces and their equipment.  Training in 1999 incorporated requirements for engineers 
and logisticians as well as civil and public affairs officers in a context that identified the 
entire exercise as a training event that provided humanitarian assistance and fostered 
regional relations.  In addition to the areas of logistics, security, and construction, 
assessment of the training in 1999 included gauging performance against standards for 
interagency involvement, support of the government and public opinion in the host 
nation, and responsiveness to requests for information by organizations and 
individuals.172  
While the exercise in Ecuador did include the objectives of providing a road as 
well as medical and veterinary treatment that would be of benefit to the people in the host 
nation, the statutory guidance was seen as a limitation.  Because the medical and 
veterinary care was of direct benefit to the people and their livestock, the host nation was 
required to fund the vaccinations provided by American forces.173  On the other hand, in 
Nicaragua the objective of providing economic benefits to the host nation did not                                                  
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preclude American funding of medical supplies and included the requirement that the 
construction project would be a “long-term investment” that “continue[d] to have pay off 
five years after completion.”174  The new understanding of the objectives placed an 
emphasis on interagency and host nation coordination, highlighted the role of the civil 
and public affairs specialties, and incorporated the principles of sustainability, 
transparency, and, to a lesser degree, participation.  
The interagency process in Ecuador in 1987 focused on ensuring that the task 
force was not duplicating other efforts of the United States government, while in 
Nicaragua in 1999 it involved ongoing coordination of the American contributions to 
hurricane recovery.  At the highest level, the American ambassadors in both cases were 
involved in the planning and provided authorization for the exercises, but coordination 
with the other members of the country team was stronger in 1999.  In Ecuador most of 
the coordination appeared to have been between the U.S. Military Group, the Southern 
Command staff, and the commander of the task force.  USAID distanced itself from the 
military because it did not focus on infrastructure projects, such as those planned in the 
HCA, and it did not want its efforts to be hampered by suspicions connected with the 
American military presence.175  
The interagency process in Nicaragua built on the strong working relationship 
between the country team and Southern Command that was established during the 
hurricane response.  Reflecting the new emphasis placed on political and diplomatic 
concerns, Southern Command’s “Civil Affairs Guidance” specified that its operations 
would be “coordinated through existing U.S. embassy offices . . .  and HN [host nation] 
agencies to select projects that best meet CINC’s intent and enhance country plans for 
long term development.”176  The result was that the military sought and benefited from 
the expertise and experience of the members of the country team, including public affairs 
staff and USAID representatives. 
Host nation coordination in Ecuador primarily dealt with meeting basic 
requirements at the highest level.  The President of Ecuador and senior military officials 
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coordinated the Memorandum of Understanding that authorized the American military 
presence.  This excluded the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Public Works, 
the Congress and local non-governmental organizations.  Coordination in Nicaragua was 
far more inclusive and involved national and community leaders representing civilian 
government agencies, the military, and some representatives of civil society.  The 
important role of the host nation in the planning process was broadcast during a press 
conference at an exercise location held by the American Ambassador with the Minister of 
Defense, the Minister of Education, and the Army Chief of Staff. 
B. THE IMPACT OF THE EXERCISES 
To what extent were the exercises effective and congruent with human rights?  
One means of measuring effectiveness is whether or not the military completed the 
training objectives it set forth and whether the construction project could be of use to the 
host nation.  By means of self-assessment, both exercises could be deemed effective by 
these standards.  But even in the 1980s, a broader conceptualization of effectiveness of 
HCA could have been derived from Secretary of Defense Carlucci’s report to Congress 
that considered HCA benefits such as promoting democracy, “strengthening local 
government infrastructures and accelerating national economic growth.”177  The political 
impact of the exercises will be discussed in terms of the expectations of the government 
of the host nation, the strengthening of local infrastructure, and the promotion of 
democracy. 
In Ecuador President Cordero was under the impression that the HCA was going 
to provide significant economic benefits to his nation, such as major road construction 
that would connect an isolated region or the transfer of technology.178  The Task Force 
Commander was aware that there were faulty assumptions that had inflated the scale of 
what the American military was going to provide.179  Beyond the assumptions, in the end   
there was the unfulfilled expectation that around eighty miles of road would be 
constructed instead of the six that was completed.  This was based on modifications to the 
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exercise plan, formally accepted by the government of Ecuador, stating the American 
military’s intention to construct a road that would connect Hollin, Loreto, and Coca180.   
While it may be largely a matter of unintended consequences, the exercise did not 
promote democratic governance in Ecuador.  The absence of transparency for the 
exercise fueled suspicion among members of the opposition party in the Ecuadorean 
Congress.  President Cordero’s decision to issue a decree authorizing the exercise 
contributed to a crisis in the government as both the Congress and the Tribunal for 
Constitutional Guarantees concluded that the decree was in violation of the Constitution.   
Additionally the road that was planned without coordinating with the Ministry of Public 
Works did not strengthen local infrastructure.  The immunizations and vaccinations 
provided as part of the exercise were of benefit to part of the population and the short 
stretch of road and a bridge assisted those who wanted to cross the Hollin River in the 
vicinity of Archidona.  However, the expectation that the exercise would connect an 
isolated region with a main center of commerce was not fulfilled, technology was not 
transferred, and the actions of the legislature and the courts indicate that the exercise did 
not promote democratic governance. 
Effectiveness, as indicated by the meeting the expectations of the host 
government, strengthening local infrastructure, and promoting democracy was stronger in 
Nicaragua in 1999.  Unrealistic host nation expectations of the benefits that would come 
from the HCA were reconciled during the planning stages in working groups led by the 
embassy that included Nicaraguan officials, members of the country team, and Southern 
Command staff.  Local infrastructure was strengthened because the projects were 
designed to be sustainable, included national and local officials in planning, and 
incorporated a partnership with a non-governmental organization that would provide 
training and the transfer of equipment.  Democracy was promoted by the inclusion of 
numerous host nation Ministries in the planning and providing transparency to the 
exercise through press releases, press conferences, and responding to inquiries.  When the 
Nicaraguan Congress finally authorized the exercise, the government was lauded for its 
observance of the rule of law.181 
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In discussing the promotion of human rights by the exercises, it should be noted 
that in the 1990s Southern Command instituted a policy that required all American 
military personnel participating in exercises in the area of operations, as well as all 
foreign military personnel that received training from the United States, to receive 
instruction in such human rights topics as the law of war and prohibitions against torture.  
These requirements were observed in Nicaragua in 1999.  Additionally, aid conditionality 
in support of human rights was observed in both Ecuador in 1987 and Nicaragua in 1999.  
In compliance with statutory guidance, the exercises were conducted in states whose 
governments were not considered guilty of “consistent pattern[s] of gross violations of 
internationally recognized human rights.”182  However, the aspects of human rights that 
will be assessed below focus on whether the two cases supported social and economic 
rights. 
As discussed in the opening chapters, the United States is not in full agreement 
with the emerging human rights agenda that includes social and economic rights.  The 
absence of an “express linkage to rights” is one of the principal reasons why American 
foreign development policies would not be considered a “rights approach to 
development” as defined by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights.183  However, there are areas of significant agreement.  This section will utilize 
the human rights agenda promoted by the United Nations Development Program that it 
proposes should be integrated across United Nations programs, including those dealing 
with security and humanitarian relief, and consider points of congruence with principles 
that were operative in HCA in the two cases.184  These are the “eradication of poverty . . . 
sustainable development . . . and good governance,” with the latter including 
decentralization, transparency and participation.185  
In the selection of the exercise sites, HCA in both Ecuador and Nicaragua were in 
agreement with the goal of eradicating poverty.  By statute the economic benefits of HCA 
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seek to serve the “basic economic and socials needs of the people.”186  In practice, as was 
the case in both in Ecuador and Nicaragua, the target populations for the benefits were 
selected because they were particularly economically disadvantaged.  Both exercises 
provided assistance to people in remote areas whose economic means and social support 
had been adversely affected by natural disaster.  The cases diverge in their promotion of 
sustainable development and good governance. 
The HCA in Ecuador may have intended to provide a road that would be used and 
maintained but the planning and execution of the project neither promoted sustainable 
development nor good governance.  The primary host nation organization involved in 
planning the exercise was the Ecuadorean Army Corps of Engineers.  The Ministry of 
Public Works, which normally planned and maintained roads, was excluded from the 
planning process.  The absence of the primary service provider in the planning process 
meant that there was no arrangement for the road and bridge to be maintained once the 
exercise was completed.  The focus on military to military coordination at the national 
level and delays by the Ecuadorean Army in responding to inquiries from members of the 
Ecuadorean Congress offered weak support to the good governance practices of 
decentralization, participation, and transparency. 
C. CONCLUSION 
A strong contrast in the ability of an HCA to promote sustainable development 
and good governance is evident in the case of Nicaragua.  Project sustainability was 
identified as a standard to be met and was an integral part of the planning process.  The 
involvement of national and local Ministry of Health officials, members of the country 
team, Southern Command staff officers, and representatives of the Florida Association of 
Volunteers for Caribbean Action in planning the exercise and the continued operation of 
the clinic were in agreement with the principles of decentralization and participation.  
Once the clinic was constructed there were stakeholders who had participated in the 
planning that would receive the training and equipment needed to provide medical care to 
the local population.      
Planning for sustainable development and good governance are points of 
agreement in the effectiveness of the project in Nicaragua, as defined above, and their                                                  
186 U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 401. 
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congruence with social and economic rights.  They also reflect American foreign policy 
and development assistance goals at the time that emphasized “linking disaster relief and 
humanitarian assistance with development cooperation,” improving accessibility to 
sustainable health care for the poor, capacity building, decentralization, transparency, and 
participation.187  One might inquire, given that the outcomes could largely be presented 
in terms of the influence of American foreign development policy and interagency 
cooperation, why has this paper placed an emphasis on social and economic rights?  My 
response is that the human rights approach is grounded in respect for the intrinsic dignity 
of the human person and provides an external and widely accepted standard that is not 
subject to changes in policy or the absence of interagency coordination.   
Expecting the military to adopt a rights based approach to HCA would be 
unreasonable in light of the fact that this would not be consistent with the current 
American foreign policy regarding social and economic rights.  However, there is 
evidence that a significant shift in HCA has taken place that has brought it closer to a 
rights based approach to development.  The planning point that inquired what could be 
done to assist the local population while we are here has been modified to consider what 
could be done so that, when we depart, the host government, the local service providers, 
and non-governmental organizations can continue to meet basic needs.  This incorporates 
sustainability and is conducive to promoting capacity building, strengthening local 
governance, and fulfilling basic rights, such as health care or education.  Similarly, the 
task of obtaining authorization to conduct the exercise has been expanded to include 
consideration of the laws and customs of the host nation so that the conduct of the 
exercise models respect for the people and their institutions, including agencies of the 
civilian government and local service providers.  The corresponding human rights themes 
include participation, transparency, and strengthening local governance. 
To make these developments known and encourage continued efforts toward 
sustainability, it is recommended that they be included in the annual Department of 
Defense Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program report to Congress.  This might be 
done by noting the projects, particularly those involving the construction of buildings, 
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that incorporated coordination with and the training of local service providers by the 
military or through a partnership with a government agency or non-governmental 
organization.  Identifying the projects that included “HCA enhancement” would give 
increased visibility to this initiative and may increase its application. 
Three areas of future research are recommended.  The first is a study that would 
analyze HCA programs, including de minimis HCA, for their support of human rights 
throughout the geographic regions.  Such as study would indicate the level of 
institutionalization of such programs as enhanced HCA as well as facilitate the 
incorporation of best practices across regions.  A second possible area of research that is 
particularly significant in light of the war on terrorism is the degree to which the United 
States promotes human rights by aid conditionality.  Finally, the post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts of the Department of Defense, both by uniformed personnel and 
civilian contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq, could be assessed for their support of the 
promotion of human rights. 
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